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VICIOUS STEREOTYPES IN POLITE SOCIETY 
Douglas Laycock* 
One of the less attractive patterns in human behavior is our 
tendency to stereotype those with whom we disagree, those whose 
interests conflict with our own, or those who are simply different 
from ourselves. Such stereotypes create and reinforce prejudice, 
and they distort our politics, our policy debates, and our constitu-
tional debates. These evils are of course well known; they are an 
important part of racism, sexism, and discrimination against lesbi-
ans and gays. But we do not appear to have generalized the lessons. 
Among the educated classes that have been most sensitized to 
the dangers of the most widely condemned stereotypes, other ste-
reotypes and prejudices flourish. Respected academics and journal-
ists, and respected journals who pride themselves on their tolerance, 
publish extraordinary statements about groups that have generally 
failed to engage the sympathies of intellectuals. 
In this brief comment, I wish to illustrate the point with a few 
clear examples. Some involve religion; one involves a potpourri of 
political and class biases. These are by no means the only examples; 
the problem is pervasive. Many of us-probably most of us-have 
acted on unstated and unexamined assumptions that would be as 
offensive as these if we committed them to print without the veil of 
euphemisms. Printed or unprinted, flagrant or veiled, these stereo-
types are corrosive of the social fabric. The only way to resist is to 
highlight them and to sensitize ourselves to them. 
• Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, The University of Texas at Austin. I 
am grateful to Patricia Cain, Joe Feagin, Joseph Hom, Sanford Levinson, Carolyn Powe, 
Lucas Powe, Fred Schauer, and Teresa Sullivan for comments on earlier drafts, and to Mark 
W arr for introducing me to the social science literature on rape. I wrote most of this article 
during a -.ery pleasant semester at the University of Michigan Law School, where Audrey 
Anderson provided valuable research assistance. 
I should also note here my immense respect for a co-editor of this journal, Suzanna 
Sherry, who chose to publish this article despite its harsh criticism of a short passage from 
her own writings. We have agreed to disagree about the content of that passage. My account 
of that disagreement is that even the most open-minded people can lapse into stereotypes on 
particular issues. 
It is instructive to compare Professor Sherry's editorial response to that of the Yale Law 
Journal. I submitted an earlier version of this paper to Yale as a reply to an article that had 
appeared in the most recent issue of that journal. The editors never acknowledged receipt of 
the manuscript. 
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One group that can still be safely insulted is the seriously reli-
gious. Fundamentalists, evangelicals, and Catholics remain fair 
game in many circles. Michael Smith has collected numerous anti-
religious passages in Supreme Court opinions, 1 one of them a quota-
tion from an anti-Catholic hate tract.2 
Suzanna Sherry, writing in the Michigan Law Review, equated 
fundamentalist legislators with racist school boards: "There are 
still racist school boards in a nation that generally finds racism in-
tolerable, fundamentalist legislators in a nation that rejects a na-
tional religion, and so on. "3 The skillful parallelism of the sentence 
packs powerful implications. Fundamentalism is parallel to racism 
as a threat to constitutional values; fundamentalists oppose the con-
sensus against a national religion just as racists oppose the consen-
sus against racism. If Professor Sherry knows that fundamentalist 
legislators are protected by the test oath clause,4 she gives no hint of 
it. If she knows that few fundamentalists want a national religion, 
she gives no hint of that either. 
Another example comes from Roger Mudd on National Public 
Television, on a special on religious liberty (of all things). An histo-
rian explained to Mudd that James Madison's fight against religious 
establishment in Virginia depended on the support of large numbers 
of evangelical Protestants.s Mudd responded: "That's really an in-
teresting political alliance . . . to have enlightened men of reason 
tied in with the evangelicals."6 Apparently Mudd thinks that no 
evangelical can be enlightened or a man of reason, and that it is 
surprising to find that evangelicals would support anything an en-
lightened man of reason would support. 
A similar thought appears in Professor Sherry's comment that 
"divine revelation and biblical literalism are irrational superstitious 
I. Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 83, 98-100. 
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 635 n.20 (1971) (Douglas, concurring), quoting 
Loraine Boettner, Roman Cotholicism 360 (Presbyterian & Reformed Pub!., 1962). For a 
description of the Boettner book, see Douglas Laycock, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 54 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 390, 418-21 (1977). 
3. Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues (Book Review), 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1418, 1432 (1989). 
4. U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 3. ("(N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualifica-
tion to any Office or public Trust under the United States."). The substance of the clause was 
applied to the states in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
S. For the relevant history, including the role of the evangelicals, see Thomas E. Buck-
ley, Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776-1787 (U. Virginia Press, 1977); 
Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the 
First Amendment (Oxford U. Press 1986); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1990). 
6. "The Supreme Court's Holy Battles," broadcast on National Public Television, 
Sept. 19, 1989 (videotape in collection of Tarlton Law Library, The University of Texas at 
Austin). 
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nonsense."7 This is somewhat different, because at least in form the 
attack is on particular ideas and not on the people who hold those 
ideas. But the harsh tone suggests a related disrespect for the peo-
ple who would believe such things. These people would seem to be 
irrational, superstitious, and lacking in sense. That implication is 
consistent with her more personal attack on fundamentalist 
legislators. 
Survey evidence shows that the great bulk of the population 
believes in divine revelation. Some 83% feel extremely close or 
somewhat close to God, 86% believe the Bible is divinely inspired, 
and 37% believe "the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be 
taken literally, word for word."s Whatever one thinks of the merits 
of these beliefs, the millions of Americans who hold them do not 
generally behave in irrational or superstitious ways. 
Academic hostility to serious religion is part of a larger cul-
tural gulf in contemporary society. The Wall Street Journal de-
nounces limousine liberals, the Beltway crowd, and the white wine 
and brie set. The people targeted by these labels denounce Rea-
ganites, hardhats, white ethnics, or-if they are above a certain 
age-Archie Bunker types. Some of these labels target a cluster of 
attitudes, some target a specific group, and none are used with pre-
cision. But from either side, such labels embody a set of political 
and cultural stereotypes: a whole group of people all have the same 
bad ideas, and that whole group of people is dangerous. Just how 
extreme such stereotypes can be is illustrated by Wendy Brown's 
remarkable anecdote in the Yale Law Journa/.9 
The anecdote is this: Emerging from a back-packing trip deep 
in the Sierra Nevada, Professor Brown discovered that her car 
would not start.w She enlisted the aid of a nearby sportsman, who 
spent the next two hours helping her get the car started. Her bene-
factor was culturally and politically very different from Professor 
Brown. He was wearing a National Rifle Association cap, he was 
surveying the woods for his hunting club, he was drinking beer and 
reading a porn magazine, and he had a satellite dish on his 
Winnebago. 
Professor Brown apparently disapproves of all these things, 
which is her right. So far it is a wonderful story about the best of 
America: two strangers who disagree on practically everything, ig-
7. Sherry, 87 Mich. L. Re,·. at 1427 (cited in note 3). 
8. Dennis A. Gilbert, Compendium Of American Public Opinion 304-06 (Facts on File 
Publications 1988). 
9. Wendy Brown, Guns. Cowboys. Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On 
Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 661 (1989). 
10. The anecdote appears id. at 666-67. 
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noring differences of politics, sex, and social and economic class, 
cooperating in the wilderness to solve a serious problem faced by 
only one of them. If de Tocqueville had been there, he would have 
reported it to his readers in France. 
But, Professor Brown reflects, it is fortunate that she had three 
friends with her. If she had run into this man alone in the woods, 
she "would have been seized with one great and appropriate fear: 
rape."ll Perhaps she would experience this fear because rape is so 
horrible that even a small risk looms large, and because at any time, 
and with any male not well known and fully trusted, there is some 
statistical risk of rape. I quite agree that rape is horrible, that there 
was some risk, that if the man had a propensity to rape, isolation 
and a gun would present a favorable opportunity and thus increase 
the risk, and that Professor Brown would be naive never to think of 
this risk. If her point were confined to this universal risk, it would 
arouse little comment. 
Even so, it is significant that this general fear of rape from any 
unknown male is analogous to the fear of street crime that many 
urban citizens experience when they encounter an unknown black.12 
Both fears project on all members of a large class the dangers asso-
ciated with a statistical risk arising from the misconduct of a small 
subset of the class. This is the essence of stereotyping-to attribute 
to all members of a group the bad traits of a few. 
The fear of unknown blacks is widely deemed racist, and is 
unlikely to be legitimated in the pages of the Yale Law Journal. 
Treating all unknown blacks with visible caution may be entirely 
rational to the risk averse, but it is properly condemned because it 
imposes serious costs in racial isolation and ostracism on all blacks, 
the great majority of whom are law abiding.I3 Similarly, however 
rational it is for women to take precautions against unknown males, 
visibly treating all males as potential rapists inflicts costs on the in-
nocent majority and further strains relations between the sexes. 
Whatever precautions may be necessary, it is important to distin-
guish in thought and rhetoric between two propositions: ( 1) Some 
men are potential rapists, and because it is impossible to tell which 
ones, there is always some risk. (2) All men are potential rapists. 
Proposition (1) is true, but proposition (2) does not follow from 
(1). 
Professor Brown's anecdote goes well beyond either of these 
II. Id. at 666. 
12. See, e.g., letter to editor in N.Y. Times A26, col. 4 (Aug. 31, 1990). 
13. For evidence of the psychological costs, see Joe R. Feagin, The Continuing Signifi-
cance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places, 56 Am. Soc. Rev. 101 (1991). 
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propostttons. The juxtaposition of her fear of rape with this man's 
personal characteristics plainly implies that with this man, she per-
ceived the risk of rape to be significantly greater than average. She 
could tell that he was a likely rapist because of his NRA cap, his 
hunting club, his beer, his satellite dish, and his porn magazine. 
That charge is implicit in the entire anecdote; there is no other rea-
son to dwell on his personal characteristics. She eventually makes 
the point explicit: "During the hours I spent with him, I had no 
reason to conclude that his respect for women's personhood ran any 
deeper than his respect for the lives of Sierra deer ... "!!t4 
There are indeed people in our society who have no more re-
spect for humans than for animals. We call them psychopaths, and 
when they act on their impulses and we catch them, we lock them 
up. They are mostly male, but as far as I can tell, they are a tiny 
percentage of the population. What is the evidence that this man 
was a psychopath? Well, the NRA cap, the hunting club, the beer, 
the satellite dish, and the porn magazine. 
We also have the evidence that he spent two hours of his lim-
ited time in the mountains helping a total stranger fix her car. The 
stranger was a woman, and he gave his time to help her; that is 
some reason to conclude that he respects women more than deer. 
That he offered to help her is not dispositive, as there are occasional 
accounts of men who help a woman and then rape her. But there is 
no evidence that Professor Brown's benefactor was such a man. He 
simply helped her. 
That did not earn him any credit with her, nor did it provide 
her any evidence that he respected women more than deer. Noth-
ing in his individual conduct could overcome Professor Brown's 
stereotype. If you fixedly believe that blacks are lazy, a hardwork-
ing black is "no reason to conclude" otherwise. Either he is an ex-
ception, or his hard work is invisible to you. For Professor Brown, 
NRA members with porn magazines are likely rapists who think of 
women as animals, and individual traits and conduct are invisible to 
her even when she is the beneficiary. 
Professor Brown's description of her benefactor emphasizes 
their political disagreements, but there are also important elements 
of class bias in the story, especially in its comparison of his beer and 
television to her trail mix and Nietzsche. However heroic the work-
ing class may be in the abstract, its members are a perpetual disap-
pointment to many academics. They do not believe what academics 
believe, read what academics read, or choose the recreation that 
14. Brown, 99 Yale L.J. at 666 (exclamation points added) (cited in note 9). 
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academics choose. They are also widely thought to be intolerant. 
But as far as I can tell, no class and no political faction dominates 
the market in intolerance. Is 
Friends who read this article in manuscript had divided reac-
tions to Professor Brown's anecdote. Some readers of each sex 
found it outrageous; other readers of each sex suggested exculpatory 
explanations. Patricia Cain reports a different distribution of reac-
tions.16 In her experience most men are outraged by the anecdote, 
and most women are outraged by the male reaction. We are both 
generalizing from small and unrepresentative samples; neither of us 
has a careful study of the correlates of reactions to the Brown anec-
dote. But I think I have a more politically diverse set of reactions. 
It seems clear to me that the most important variable that causes 
different reactions is not sex, but politics. Liberal individualist fem-
inists of either sex may be outraged by the Brown anecdote, but 
somewhere on the continuum from liberal individualist feminism to 
radical class-oppression feminism, people first begin to explain the 
anecdote away, then to not be troubled by it at all, and finally, to be 
angry at the suggestion that anyone might have been offended. 
The suggested exculpatory explanations of the Brown anecdote 
are revealing in themselves. One reader said that Professor Brown 
was talking about her feelings, and not about an objective increase 
in risk. Another said that maybe she was talking about a tiny Baye-
sian increase in risk, but even a tiny increase is significant when the 
risk is as horrible as rape. 
The extreme subjectivity of the first explanation contrasts 
sharply with the mathematical rigor of the second. Both explana-
tions came from my readers' advocacy skills; neither came from the 
apparent meaning of Brown's text. These are the sort of explana-
tions that are greeted with derision after a public figure says some-
thing offensive to racial minorities. If the authenticity of Professor 
Brown's feelings makes objective data irrelevant, then the authentic 
feelings of confirmed racists are equally valid and make objective 
data equally irrelevant. A willingness to explain away slurs against 
some groups, while putting the worst possible reading on every real 
15. For other perspectives on class bias and related ethnic bias, see Andrew M. Greeley, 
Why Can't They Be Like Us: America's White Ethnic Groups (E.P. Dutton, 1971); Michael 
Lerner, Respectable Bigotry, 38 Am. Scholar 606 (1969). For a collection of other abusive 
epithets directed against gun owners in political debate, press accounts, and academic litera-
ture, see Don B. Kates, Guns. Murders, And The Constitution 6-9, 11-14 (Pacific Research 
Inst., 1990). 
16. Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 76 Iowa L. Rev.- (1991) (forthcom-
ing). My account of Professor Cain's views also draws on several conversations and an oral 
presentation of her paper. 
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or imagined slight against other groups, independently illustrates 
the problem I am describing. 
It is useful to consider how the story would have been told if 
Professor Brown's car had broken down in Harlem instead of in the 
mountains. Suppose her benefactor had been a young black male 
with a radical political button, and suppose he carried a gun, a beer, 
a porn magazine, and a boombox. I am confident that her report of 
the encounter would have been very different. Either her fear of 
rape would not have appeared in a respectable journal, or it would 
have appeared in a confessional tone and emphasized a very differ-
ent moral. The point would have been: "He came only to help me, 
and I was afraid to let him help; see how fear and racism distorts 
our whole society." The point would not have been: "I was forced 
to ask him for help, and it is a good thing I was not alone or he 
might have raped me." 
Some readers are undoubtedly thinking that stereotyping 
blacks or women or even white males is importantly different from 
stereotyping NRA members, evangelicals, or porn readers. NRA 
members, evangelicals, and porn readers have evidenced a belief, or 
at least a taste, that they hold individually and that makes them 
different in some important way from people who do not hold the 
same belief or have the same taste. But any individual black or 
woman or white male may be different from even a statistically ac-
curate generalization about the group into which he or she was 
born. 
This difference is real. It is reasonable to infer that Professor 
Brown and her NRA benefactor disagree fundamentally about 
guns, about hunting, and about pornography. They probably disa-
gree about sex roles, but this inference is less certain.17 It is entirely 
legitimate to take their disagreements seriously, and for each to ar-
gue about the costs that the other's views and behavior might im-
pose on other individuals or on the society generally. It is equally 
legitimate for religious believers and non-believers to take their dis-
agreements seriously. 
What is illegitimate is to assume that these real differences im-
ply other more offensive differences, up to and including a propen-
sity to felony. Millions of American men own guns, go hunting, 
drink beer, and read porn magazines. The group targeted by 
Brown's smear includes my father, my father-in-law, and most of 
the working-class men I knew as a youth. They were mostly decent 
human beings, struggling to support their families, with a small 
17. One study found no correlation between gun ownership and attitudes toward femi-
nism. See text accompanying note 36. 
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fraction of the power and status that Wendy Brown enjoys as a ten-
ured academic. In retrospect, I do not think much of their sexual 
politics, although at least one of them raised an extraordinary 
daughter. But it is an enormous inferential leap from their politics 
and their social class to a propensity to rape. Very few men of any 
social class rape strangers in surprise attacks or equate women with 
the deer they hunt. There is a name for the mental process that 
imputes to such a large group the evil of a few members. The name 
is bigotry. 
It is easy to be tolerant of unimportant differences. But all of 
us tend to think the worst of people who disagree with us on really 
important things. We tend to assume that our opponents followed 
the same chain of reasoning we did, so that if they reject our conclu-
sion, they must also reject our most fundamental premise. If they 
believe that-fill in any belief that really upsets you-then they 
must also believe even worse things, and if they believe such bad 
things, they are likely to act on them. We have all thought in this 
way, and sometimes spoken or written in this way. I do not exempt 
myself. 
Direct mail fund raisers play on these stereotypes, aggravate 
them, and profit from them.ts It is much easier to raise money to 
fight the devil than to raise money to fine-tune the balance of inter-
ests between two groups of Americans who subscribe to many of the 
same basic values. Stereotyping the opponent lends itself to power-
ful labels in an argument. There is emotional punch to calling 
someone a racist or a likely rapist, an atheist or a communist, a 
persecutor or a fanatic. Willingness to use such labels can intimi-
date some opponents into silence. 
But these stereotypes also poison our public discourse, distort 
our understanding of the real differences among us, and reduce the 
chances for resolving those differences even in part. These stereo-
types corrode the bonds of mutual concern and respect that hold a 
pluralistic society together. These bonds are stretched enough by 
honest disagreement and simple demands for change. Once in our 
history they broke entirely, and some minority groups have been 
placed outside their protection for long periods. But generally these 
bonds have held. They make it unsurprising when Americans from 
"opposite ends of the political and cultural universe" help one 
another.t9 
To corrode these bonds unnecessarily is a dangerous thing. 
18. See E. J. Dionne, Politics: To Give the Devils Their Due, It Pays From a Fundraising 
Standpoint to Have Them Around, N.Y. Times A24, col. 5 (May 23, 1989). 
19. The quotation is from Brown, 99 Yale L.J. at 666 (cited in note 9). 
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And we should have no illusions about who is most endangered. In 
any outbreak of intolerance, in any reduction of mutual concern 
and respect, the weak and oppressed will suffer more than the 
strong and dominant. Those who are most endangered by stereo-
types and prejudice have special reasons to avoid invoking their 
own stereotypes and prejudices against others. 
Appendix 
At the risk of diverting the issue, I feel compelled by readers' 
comments to report some of the available social science data on the 
stereotypes embodied in Professor Brown's anecdote. I emphasize 
that the data in this Appendix are distinctly secondary to my princi-
pl!l point. It is generally a mistake to think of persons with different 
political or cultural values as prone to rape or any other evil. That 
point holds whatever the general incidence of rape, and even if rape 
occurs at a slightly higher rate among the particular political or 
cultural group than in the general population. The issue I raise is 
not whether the true risk is 10% or 1% or 1/10 of 1%, but rather 
that it is wrong to impute the dangerous propensity to the other 
90%, 99%, or 99.9%. 
The cumulative risk of rape over a lifetime is substantial, but 
the risk in any one encounter with an unknown male is incalculably 
small. The largest data set is the Justice Department's fourteen-
year aggregation of data from the National Crime Survey.2o More 
than one hundred thousand respondents per year, half of them wo-
men, all age twelve or older, were asked a series of questions about 
whether they had been victims of crime in the preceding year. The 
reported annual incidence of rape and attempted rape was 1.6 per 
1000 women, or 1/6 of 1 %.2t In the Survey questionnaire, a "ver-
bal threat" of rape counts as an attempt,22 and in an earlier publica-
tion based on the first ten years of these data, 25% of the reported 
incidents were verbal threats.23 Over the entire fourteen-year pe-
riod, the annual rate of completed rapes in the general female popu-
lation aged 12 and over was .6 per 1000, or about 6/100 of 1%.24 
Only about half these incidents had been reported to the po-
20. Caroline Wolf Harlow, Female Victims of Violent Crime (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
1991) ("Female Victims"). 
21. ld., Table 13. 
22. ld. at 10. 
23. U.S. Dept. of Justice, The Crime of Rape, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin 5 
(1985). 
24. Harlow, Female Victims at Table 13 (cited in note 20). 
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lice.2s Thus, the Survey does much to correct for the underreport-
ing of rape in official crime statistics. But there is still some 
underreporting in the Survey. A small study in San Jose found that 
one-third of rapes reported to the police were not reported to inter-
viewers when the Survey questionnaire was later administered to 
victims.26 There is no reliable way to estimate the percentage of 
victims who report neither to the police nor to interviewers. If we 
inflate the Survey data by a third based on the San Jose study, and 
by another third as a sheer guess about the rapes reported to neither 
police nor interviewer, the annual rate of rape, attempted rape, and 
verbal threat of rape rises to 2.8 per 1000, or not quite 3/10 of 1%. 
The Survey reports age- and race-specific rates for seven age 
classes.n The highest rate was 5.5 per 1000 for black women aged 
20-24. In the classes that include most women academics, the rate 
was 2.3 per 1000 for white women aged 25-34, and .6 per 1000 for 
white women aged 35-49. If we make the simplifying assumption 
that the reported rate for each age class applies to each age in the 
class, and if we then cumulate the age-specific rates for each age, we 
get a crude estimate of the lifetime risk of rape. These Survey data 
suggest that from age 12 to 80, 85.4 of every 1000 women, or about 
8.5%, would experience a rape, attempted rape, or verbal threat of 
rape. Just over a third of these women, or about 3% of the popula-
tion, would experience a completed rape. If we inflate these num-
bers by a third and then by another third as a crude estimate of 
underreporting, we get a lifetime risk of 15.2% for rape, attempted 
rape, or verbal threat of rape, and 5.2% for completed rape.2s 
An estimate of women's lifetime risk of rape is not an estimate 
of the percentage of men who will rape. Large numbers of rapes are 
committed by a small number of serial rapists.29 There is no way to 
quantify this factor, but the percentage of men who rape-and thus 
the odds that Professor Brown's benefactor might someday commit 
or attempt a rape-must be very much smaller than the percentage 
of women who are raped. 
25. ld. at Table 18. 
26. City of San Jose Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, San Jose Methods 
Test Of Known Crime Victims (1972). 
27. Harlow, Female Victims at 8 (cited in note 20). 
28. A rounding error in the Survey data makes the ratio of completed to attempted 
rapes ambiguous in a way that slightly affects this calculation. The Survey reports rates per 
1000 female population of .6 completed rapes, 1.1 attempted rapes, and 1.6 total. Carried to 
two decimals, the ratio of completed to attempted rapes could be as low as .55 to 1.10 (.33) or 
as high as .59 to 1.06 (.36). The figures in text use the median possibility of .57 to 1.08, or .35. 
29. Gene G. Abel, MaryS. Mittelman & Judith V. Becker, Sexual Offenders: Results of 
Assessment and Recommendations for Treatment, in Mark H. Ben-Aron, Stephen J. Hucker, 
and Christopher D. Webster, eds., Clinical Criminology: The Assessment and Treatment of 
Criminal Behavior (Univ. of Toronto, 1985). 
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These numbers from the National Crime Survey are considera-
bly lower than the numbers commonly cited in the feminist litera-
ture. The reasons for the discrepancy are complex and not entirely 
clear. But I am tentatively persuaded by Susan Estrich, who con-
cludes that the difference is "largely definitional."Jo Most women 
appear not to define as rape a range of sexual pressure in dating 
situations that feminist scholars do define as rape.3' The percentage 
of men who would take unfair advantage in a dating situation is 
probably much larger than the percentage of men who would rape a 
stranger. Whatever one thinks of the moral value of that distinc-
tion, large numbers of both men and women appear to see the situa-
tions as quite distinct. Estrich would begin to solve the problem by 
defining degrees of rape, or lesser included offenses.32 
This definitional dispute is not relevant to the Brown anecdote. 
Professor Brown was not in a dating situation; what she had to fear 
was stranger rape at gunpoint. The National Crime Survey data 
appears to provide the best available estimate of that risk. The Sur-
vey reports any incident that the victim defines as a rape or at-
tempted rape, and surely few women would define stranger rape at 
gunpoint as anything other than rape. 
There is no evidence that hunters or gun enthusiasts are dis-
proportionately prone to rape. One study found no correlation be-
tween reported incidents of rape and the number of hunting licenses 
issued in a jurisdiction;33 another study found statistically signifi-
cant negative correlations after controlling for population.34 A 
third study found no correlation between rape and the number of 
subscriptions to gun and hunting magazines.Js A fourth study 
30. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1169 (1986). 
31. See id. at 1161-69. For some of the questions and definitions used in studies cited in 
the feminist literature, see Neil Gilbert, The Phantom Epidemic of Sexual Assault, 103 The 
Public Interest 54, 57-61 (Spring 1991 ). For the questions and definitions used in the N a-
tiona! Crime Survey, see Harlow, Female Victims at 10 (cited in note 20). 
32. Estrich, 95 Yale L.J. at 1179-84 (cited in note 30). 
33. L. Baron & M. Straus, Legitimate Violence and Rape: A Test of the Cultural Spil-
lover Theory (paper presented at the Eastern Sociological Society meeting, 1985) (cited in I 
Attorney General's Commission On Pornography, Final Repon 946 (1986)) ("Final Repon"). 
34. Chris W. Eskridge, Zero-Order Inverse Co"elations Between Crimes of Violence and 
Hunting Licenses in the United States, 71 Sociology & Social Research 55, 56-57 Tables 2-3 
(October 1986). For other studies showing no correlation or negative correlations between 
gun ownership and rates of violent crime, see David McDowall, Gun Availability and Rob-
bery Rates: A Panel Study of Large U.S. Cities, 1974-1978, 8 Law & Pol. Q. 135 (1986); Gary 
K.Jeck, The Relationship Between Gun Ownership Levels and Rates of Violence in the United 
States, in Don B. Kates, ed., Firearms And Violence 99 (Ballinger Pub., 1984); Alan 1. Lizotte 
and David J. Bordua, Firearms Ownership for Spon and Protection: Two Not So Divergent 
Models, 46 Am. Soc. Rev. 499 (1981); Douglas R. Murray, Handguns, Gun Control Laws and 
Firearm Violence, 23 Soc. Probs. 81 (1975). 
35. Scott and Schwalm (1985) (cited without further identification in I Final Report at 
948 (cited in note 33)). 
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found no correlation between gun ownership and attitudes toward 
feminism.36 Guns are used in only 9% of all rapes and attempts,37 
and it is a reasonable guess that nearly all of these are handguns 
rather than hunting weapons. But Professor Brown is right that a 
gun increases a rapist's chance of success: guns were used in 6% of 
attempted rapes and 13% of completed rapes.3s 
A Philadelphia study suggests that the rapist had been drink-
ing in 24% of rapes,39 but alcohol is implicated in a much larger 
percentage of other violent crimes. 40 Thus, alcohol is generally con-
ducive to crime, including rape, but the relationship is weaker for 
rape than for other crimes. No one appears to have studied whether 
beer drinkers, as opposed to wine drinkers or hard liquor drinkers, 
are disproportionately prone to rape. Nor does anyone appear to 
have studied whether owners of Winnebagos or satellite dishes are 
disproportionately prone to rape. 
Whether rapists are incited by pornography is a hotly debated 
question. Many of the conflicting studies are summarized in the 
Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, 
which tentatively concluded that sex offenses are related at least to 
exposure to violent or deviant pornography at an unusually early 
age.4t A more recent study found a statistically significant correla-
tion between rape rates and the sale of soft core pornographic 
magazines in each state. 42 But the correlation disappeared when 
the researchers controlled for attitudes towards non-sexual 
violence. 43 
Thus, there is evidence that some rapists have been influenced 
by alcohol or pornography. This relationship might tum out to be 
substantial when rapists are the denominator-when we ask what 
percentage of rapists drink beer or read pornographic magazines. 
But the effect remains very small when rapists are the numerator-
36. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, et al., Crime And Punishment: Changing Attitudes In 
America 113 (Jossey-Bass Pub., 1980). 
37. Harlow, Female Victims at Table 25 (cited in note 20). 
38. ld. 
39. Menachem Amir, Patterns in Forcible Rape 99, Table 33 (U. Chi. Press, 1971). 
40. Another Philadelphia study found that 54.4% of homicide offenders had been 
drinking shortly before they killed. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Patterns in Criminal Homicide 136, 
Table 14 (U. Penn., 1958). 
41. The social science literature is reviewed in I Final Report at 901-76 (cited in note 
33). The conclusions are summarized id. at 974-76. For criticism and defense of the report, 
see Daniel Linz, Steven D. Penrod, & Edward Donnerstein, The Attorney General's Commis-
sion on Pornography: The Gaps Between "Findings" and Facts, 1987 Am. B. Foundation 
Research J. 713; Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 
1987 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 737. 
42. Larry Baron and Murray A. Strauss, Four Theories of Rape in American Society: A 
State-Level Analysis 182-86 (Yale U. Press, 1989). 
43. ld. at 186-87. 
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when we ask what percentage of men who drink beer or read porno-
graphic magazines commit or attempt rape. 
Exposure to beer and pornographic magazines is very wide-
spread. A Gallup Poll in 1985 reported that more than 90% of 
American males under age 50 have "ever" read a magazine "like 
Playboy or Penthouse," and that about 60% "sometimes buy or 
read" such magazines.44 Similarly, some 72% of the male popula-
tion sometimes drinks alcoholic beverages,4s and 86% of what they 
drink is beer.46 Only a tiny percentage of these men ever rape or 
attempt to rape a stranger. The inference from beer and a porno-
graphic magazine to a risk of rape is weak-so weak that its princi-
pal function is to viciously stereotype the great majority. Whatever 
the evils of alcohol and pornography, it is a serious mistake to think 
of all these men as prone to rape in a chance encounter. 
44. I Final Repon at 920 (cited in note 33). 
45. Gallup Report No. 258 at 9 (March 1987). 
46. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract Of The United States 125, Table 204 
(llOth ed. 1990). 
